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Se urity of ordinary digital signature s hemes relies on a omputational assumption. Fail-stop signature s hemes provide se urity for a sender against a forger
with unlimited omputational power by enabling the sender to provide a proof of
forgery, if it o urs. In this paper, we give an eÆ ient fail-stop signature s heme
that uses two hard problems, dis rete logarithm and fa torisation, as the basis
of re eiver's se urity. We show that the s heme has provable se urity against
adaptively hosen message atta k and is the most eÆ ient s heme with respe t to
the ratio of the message length to the signature length. The s heme provides an
eÆ ient solution to signing messages up to 1881 bits.
Keywords: Fail-Stop Signature S hemes, Dis rete Logarithm, Fa torisation, Optimality,
EÆ ien y
1. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures, introdu ed in [7℄, are the most important ryptographi primitive for providing authenti ation in ele troni world. The original de nition of
digital signature was subsequently revised [8℄ to ensure
se urity against a more stringent type of atta k known
as adaptive hosen message atta k. Despite the stronger
requirement, se urity in digital signature s hemes remains omputational and hen e an enemy with unlimited omputing power an always forge a signature. We
refer to this type of signature as an ordinary signature
s heme.
In an ordinary signature s heme if a forgery o urs
the sender must bear its onsequen es and there is no
way for him to show that a forgery has o urred. This
is unavoidable as if the signer is allowed to disavow a
forged signature, sin e there is no way of distinguishing
between a forged from one generated by the signer, the
signer might also disavow his own signature resulting
in vanishing a ountability in the system. This means
that the se urity for the signer is omputational and
if the underlying omputational assumption is broken
a forged signature an be irrefutably reated. On the
other hand the se urity of the re eivers is un onditional
as veri ation is a publi pro ess.
To provide prote tion against forgeries of an enemy
with unlimited omputational power, fail-stop signature
(FSS) s hemes were proposed [25, 18, 14℄. In a FSS, in
the ase of forgery, the presumed signer an provide a
proof that a forgery has happened. This is by showing

that the underlying omputational assumption of the
system is broken. The system will be stopped at this
stage- hen e the name fail-stop. In this way, a polynomially bounded signer an be prote ted against a forger
with unlimited omputational power. We note that an
unbounded re eiver an forge a signature but again a
proof of forgery shows that the omputational assumption of the system is broken and the system will be
stopped. It an be shown that (Theorem 3.2 [14℄) a
se ure FSS an be used to onstru t an ordinary digital signature that is se ure in the sense of [8℄ and so a
fail-stop signature s heme provides a stronger notion of
se urity.
In a FSS there are a number of parti ipants: a signer
who signs a message that is veri able by everyone with
a ess to his publi key, and is prote ted against forgery
of an unbounded enemy, one or more re ipients and a
entre who is trusted by the re ipient. All the re eivers
who take part in the key generation pro ess and are
onvin ed about the goodness of the key, are prote ted
from repudiation of the signature by the signer. There is
another group of parti ipants, the so- alled risk-bearers,
su h as insuran e ompanies, who will bear a loss if a
proof of forgery is a epted and hen e a signature is
invalidated. For simpli ity we do not make any distin tion between a re ipient and a risk bearer.
In a FSS, the signer and the re ipients are assumed to
be polynomially bounded, while the enemy is assumed
to have unlimited omputational power [24, 23, 17℄. A
system may be designed for one or more re ipients. It is
important to note that a 'single re ipient' system only

refers to the prote tion provided against signer's repudiation, and signature veri ation ( alled testing in the
ontext of FSS) an always be performed by anyone who
has a ess to the publi key. That is, a single re ipient
system an be seen as an ordinary signature with the
added property that a designated re ipient is prote ted
against disavowal of the signature by the signer, and
the signer is prote ted against an all powerful forger.
These kinds of requirements are very ommon in ele troni ommer e systems when a ustomer primarily
intera ts with a single nan ial institution, su h as a
bank. In this ase, it is reasonable to assume that the
bank is more powerful and the ustomer requires prote tion against possible forgeries of the bank. At the
same time, the bank must be ensured that the signer
annot repudiate his signature. Using a FSS with a single re ipient a hieves both these requirements.
In a single re ipient FSS, the role of the trusted entre
is played by the re ipient and hen e no trusted entre
is required. For a general FSS, eliminating the entre
requires a se ure multi-party omputation (for example,
[18, 19, 22℄).
A FSS in its basi form is a one-time digital signature that an only be used for signing a single message.
However, it is possible to extend a FSS s heme to be
used for signing multiple messages [5, 24, 16, 1℄.
To assess eÆ ien y of a FSS s heme a number of riteria, in luding the lengths of the signature, the se ret
key and the publi key, together with the amount of
omputation and ommuni ation required for signature
generation and veri ation (testing), are used.

1.1. Previous Works
The rst onstru tion of fail-stop signature [25℄ uses a
one-time signature s heme (similar to [11℄) and results
in bit by bit signing of the message and so is very impra ti al.
In [15℄ an eÆ ient single-re ipient FSS to prote t
lients in an on-line payment system, is proposed. The
main disadvantage of this system is that signature generation is a 3-round proto ol between the signer and the
re ipient and so is very expensive in terms of ommuniation. The size of the signature is twi e the length of
the message.
In [24℄, an eÆ ient FSS that uses the diÆ ulty of the
dis rete logarithm problem as the underlying assumption is presented. In the ase of a forgery, the presumed
signer an solve an instan e of the dis rete logarithm
problem, and prove that the underlying assumption is
broken. This is the most eÆ ient s heme known so far
and will be referred to as vHP s heme.
In [14, 17℄, a formal de nition of FSS s hemes is given
and a general onstru tion using bundling homomorphism is proposed. The important property of this onstru tion is that it is provably se ure against the most
stringent type of atta k, that is adaptive hosen message atta k [9℄. The proof of forgery is by showing two

di erent signatures on the same message, the forged one
and the one generated by the valid signer. To verify the
proof of forgery the two signatures are shown to ollide under the 'bundling homomorphism'. An instan e
of this onstru tion uses the diÆ ulty of fa toring as
the underlying omputational assumption of the system
[23℄.
It is shown [14, 17℄ that vHP s heme is in fa t an instantiation of this general onstru tion and so has provable se urity. This ombined with eÆ ien y has made
vHP s heme the ben hmark for FSS s hemes.
The existen e ondition for FSS is relaxed in [2, 19,
23℄ and it is shown that a FSS only exists if one-way
permutations exist.
In [22℄, an RSA-based FSS is proposed in whi h the
underlying intra tability assumption is the diÆ ulty of
fa toring and the proof of forgery is by showing the nontrivial fa tors of the modulus. In this s heme the size
of the signature is twi e that of the vHP s heme (four
times the size of the message) and ompared with [24℄,
has equal or worse performan e in all other aspe ts of
interest. The proof of se urity is through a number of
theorems that bound the su ess probabilities of di erent atta kers.

1.2. Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a new FSS s heme that is almost as eÆ ient as vHP s heme and its se urity relies
on two well-a epted omputational assumptions, Disrete Logarithm and Fa torisation. We introdu e a new
measure of eÆ ien y that is related to eÆ ient use of
ommuni ation bandwidth and show that our s heme
outperforms vHP s heme (and all other s hemes that
are based on fa torisation problem). We prove that
the su ess han e of an unbounded forger is limited by
the re ipient's se urity parameter while signer's se urity
against adaptive hosen message atta k is guaranteed to
a level determined by the sender's se urity parameter.
The proof of forgery is by revealing the non-trivial fa tors of the modulus. We in orporate the idea from [3℄
for the onstru tion of our s heme. Finally, we ompare
the optimality and eÆ ien y between our s heme and
vHP s heme.
The paper is organised as follows. In se tion 2, we
present the basi on epts and de nitions of FSS, and
brie y review the general onstru tion and its relevant
se urity properties. In se tion 3, we present our FSS
onstru tion, show that it is an instan e of the general
onstru tion [14℄ and hen e provide omplete proof of
se urity. In se tion 4, we introdu e the notions of optimality and eÆ ien y, and give a fair omparison between our s heme and the other existing s hemes based
on these notions. Finally, se tion 5 on ludes the paper.

2. PRELIMINARIES
In this se tion, we brie y re all relevant notions, de nitions and requirements of fail-stop signatures and refer
the reader to [18, 17, 14℄ for a more omplete a ount.

2.1. Notations
The length of a number n is the length of its binary representation and is denoted by jnj2 . pjq means p divides
q.
The ring of integers modulo a number n is denoted
by Zn , and its multipli ative group, whi h ontains only
the integers relatively prime to n, by Zn . Let N denote
the natural numbers.

2.2. Review of Fail-Stop Signatures S hemes
Similar to an ordinary digital signature s heme, a failstop signature s heme onsists of one polynomial time
proto ol and two polynomial time algorithms.
1. Key generation: is a two party proto ol between
the signer and the entre to generate a pair of se ret
key, sk , and publi key, pk . This is di erent from
ordinary signature s hemes where key generation is
performed by the signer individually and without
the involvement of the re eiver.
2. Sign: is the algorithm used for signature generation. For a message m and using the se ret key sk ,
the signature is given by y = sign(sk ; m).
3. Test: is the algorithm for testing a eptability of a
signature. For a message m and signature y , and
given the publi key pk , the algorithm produ es an
ok response if the signature is a eptable under pk .
?
That is test(pk ; m; y ) =
ok.
A FSS also in ludes two more polynomial time algorithms:
4. Proof: is an algorithm for proving a forgery;
5. Proof-test: is an algorithm for verifying that the
proof of forgery is valid.
A se ure fail-stop signature s heme must satisfy the following properties [23, 17, 14℄.
1. If the signer signs a message, the re ipient must be
able to verify the signature ( orre tness).
2. A polynomially bounded forger annot reate
forged signatures that su essfully pass the veriation test (re ipient's se urity).
3. When a forger with an unlimited omputational
power su eeds in forging a signature that passes
the veri ation test, the presumed signer an onstru t a proof of forgery and onvin es a third party
that a forgery has o urred (signer's se urity).
4. A polynomially bounded signer annot reate a signature that he an later prove to be a forgery (nonrepudiability).

To a hieve the above properties, for ea h publi key,
there exists many mat hing se ret keys su h that different se ret keys reate di erent signatures on the same
message. The real signer knows only one of the se ret
keys, and an onstru t one of the many possible signatures. An enemy with unlimited omputing power,
although an generate all the signatures but annot determine whi h one is generated by the true signer. Thus,
it would be possible for the signer to provide a proof of
forgery by generating a se ond signature on the message
with a forged signature, and use the two signatures to
show the underlying omputational assumption of the
system is broken, hen e proving the forgery.
Se urity of a FSS an be broken if 1) a signer an onstru t a signature that he an later prove to be a forgery,
or 2) an unbounded forger su eeds in onstru ting a
signature that the signer annot prove that it is forged.
These two types of forgeries are ompletely independent
and so two di erent se urity parameters, k and  , are
used to show the level of se urity against the two types
of atta ks. More spe i ally, k is the se urity level of
the re ipient and  is that of the signer. It is proved
[14℄ that a se ure FSS is se ure against adaptive hosen
message atta k and for all > 0 and large enough k ,
su ess probability of a polynomially bounded forger is
bounded by k . For a FSS with se urity level  for the
signer, the su ess probability of an unbounded forger
is limited by 2  .
In the following we brie y re all the general onstru tion given in [14℄ and outline its se urity properties.

2.3. The General Constru tion
The onstru tion is for a single-message fail-stop signature and uses bundling homomorphisms. Bundling
homomorphisms an be seen as a spe ial kind of hash
fun tions.
Definition 2.1. [14℄ A bundling homomorphism h
is a homomorphism h : G ! H between two Abelian
groups (G; +; 0) and (H; ; 1) that satis es the following.

1. Every image h(x) has at least 2 preimages. 2
is alled bundling degree of the homomorphism.
2. It is infeasible to nd ollisions, i.e., two di erent
elements that are mapped to the same value by h.
To give a more pre ise de nition, we need to onsider two families of groups, G = (GK ; +; 0) and H =
(HK ; ; 1), and a family of polynomial-time fun tions
indexed by a key, K . The key is determined by the appli ation of a key generation algorithm g (k;  ), on two
input parameters k and  . The two parameters determine the diÆ ulty of nding ollision and the bundling
degrees of the homomorphisms, respe tively. Given a
pair of input parameters, k;  2 N , rstly, using the key
generation algorithm, a key K is al ulated and then,
GK , HK and hK are determined. For a formal def-

inition of bundling homomorphisms see De nition 4.1
[14℄.
A bundling homomorphism an be used to onstru t
a FSS s heme as follows.
Let the se urity parameters of the FSS be given as k
and  . The bundling degree of the homomorphism,  ,
will be obtained as a fun tion of  as shown below.
1. Prekey generation: The entre omputes K =
g(k;  ) and so determines a homomorphism hK ,
and two groups GK and HK . Let G = GK ,
H = KK and h = hK .
2. Prekey veri ation: The signer must be assured
that K is a possible output of the algorithm g (k;  ).
This an be through providing a zero-knowledge
proof by the entre or by testing the key by the
signer. In any ase the han e of a epting a bad
key must be at most 2  .
3. Main key generation genA : the signer generates
her se ret key sk := (sk1 ; sk2 ) by hoosing sk1 and
sk2 randomly in G and omputes pk := (pk1 ; pk2 )
where pki := h(ski ) for i = 1; 2.
4. The message spa e M is a subset of Z .
5. Signing: The signature on a message m 2 M is,

s = sign(sk; m) = sk1 + m  sk2

where multiplying by m is m times addition in G.
6. Testing the signature: an be performed by he king,
pk1  pk2m =? h(s)
7. Proof of forgery: Given an a eptable signature
s0 2 G on m su h that s0 6= sign(sk; m), the signer
omputes s := sign(sk; m) and proof := (s; s0 ).
8. Verifying proof of forgery: Given a pair (x; x0 ) 2
G  G, verify that x 6= x0 and h(x) = h(x0 ).
Theorem 4.1 [14℄ proves that for any family of
bundling homomorphisms and any hoi e of parameters
the general onstru tion:
1. produ es orre t signature;
2. a polynomially bounded signer annot onstru t a
valid signature and a proof of forgery;
3. if an a eptable signature s 6= sign(sk; m ) is
found the signer an onstru t a proof of forgery.
Moreover for two hosen parameters k and  , a good
prekey K and two messages m; m 2 M , with m 6= m ,
let

T := fd 2 Gjh(d) = 1 ^ (m

m)d = 0g

(1)

Theorem 4.2 [14℄ shows that given s = sign(sk; m) and
a forged signature s 2 G su h that test(pk; m ; s ) =
ok, the probability that s = sign(sk; m) is at most
jT j=2 and so the best han e of su ess for an unrestri ted forger to onstru t an undete table forgery is
bounded by jT j=2 . Thus to provide the required level
of se urity  , we must hoose jT j=2  2  .

This general onstru tion is the basis of all known
provably se ure onstru tions of FSS. It provides a powerful framework by whi h proving se urity of a s heme
is redu ed to spe ifying the underlying homomorphism,
and determining the bundling degree and the set T .

3. A NEW AND EFFICIENT FSS SCHEME
In this se tion we introdu e a new FSS s heme and show
that it is an instan e of the general onstru tion. As will
be shown in se tion 4, the s heme outperforms the most
eÆ ient known FSS (i.e. vHP s heme) with respe t to
the message-length. Proof of forgery is by revealing the
se ret fa tors of a modulus and so verifying the proof is
very eÆ ient.
Firstly, we des ribe our s heme with a single re ipient
model, for simpli ity. Then, we extend this model to a
multiple re ipient s heme.

Model

There is only a single re ipient, R who also plays the
role of the trusted entre and performs prekey generation of the s heme.

Prekey Generation

Given the two se urity parameters k and  , R hooses
two large safe primes p and q . Then, R nds a prime
P su h that n = pq divides P 1. Finally R sele ts
an element su h that the multipli ative order of
modulo P is p (ordP ( ) = p). , n and P are sent to
the signer via an authenti ated hannel. (More details
on sele tion of these parameters are given below.)

Prekey Veri ation

If the re eiver is trusted, the prekey will be a epted
by the signer S and no prekey veri ation is needed
(as in [24℄). On the other hand, if the re eiver is not
trusted, a zero-knowledge proof is needed to assure that
the prekey is orre t. This issue will be dis ussed in the
next se tion (multiple re ipient s heme).

Key Generation
S hooses k1 ; k2 2 Zn and omputes
1

= k1 mod P

2

= k2 mod P

The private key is (k1 ; k2 ) and the publi key is ( 1 ;

Signing a Message x

To sign a message x 2 Zn , S omputes

y = k1 x + k2 mod n
and publishes y as his signature on x.

Testing a Signature
y passes the test if
?
y=
x
1

2

mod P

2

).

holds.

Proof of Forgery

If there is a forged signature y 0 whi h passes the test,
the presumed sender an generate his own signature,
namely y , on the same message, and the following equation will hold:
y = y0 mod P
or

y = y0 mod p
y y0 = p; 2 Z
Hen e, a non-trivial fa tor of n an be found by omputing g d(y y 0 ; n). We note that the probability of y
is equal to y 0 is 1=q .
We make the following remarks on the key generation
algorithm. In [10℄, it is shown that for a randomly sele ted n, P su h that n divides P 1 is upper bounded
by n log22 n. Moreover if jnj2 = k , then on average it
takes O(log k ) probabilisti steps to nd su h a P . An
element is sele ted su h that the multipli ative order
of modulo P is p (ordP ( ) = p). This element an
be easily found, by for example, randomly hoosing an
element ~ 2 ZP and al ulating = (~ ) q mod P , for
= P n 1 . If 6= 1, then has order p. This is in fa t
"pushing" the element ~ into a subgroup of order p.

3.1. Se urity Proof
We show that this s heme is an instan e of the general
onstru tion with the following underlying bundling homomorphism family.

Dis rete Logarithm Bundling Homomorphism






key generation g : on input k and  , two primes p
and q with jq j2 =  , and jpj2  jq j2 , a prime P
su h that n divides P 1 and jnj2 = k , and an
element of order p is hosen. The key will be
K = (p; q; ; P ).
families of groups: Let n = pq . De ne GK = Zn
and HK = ZP .
The homomorphism h(p;q; P ) is

h(p;q; ;P ) : Zn ! ZP ; h(p;q; ;P ) (x) = x (mod P )

Dis rete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [21℄

Given I = (p; ; ), where p is prime,
primitive element and 2 Zp , where
a



it is hard to nd a = log

2 Zp

is a

(mod p)
.

Fa torisation Assumption [20, 21℄

Given n = pq , where p and q are prime, it is hard to
nd a non-trivial fa tor of n (without the knowledge of
(n) = (p 1)(q 1)).
Strong Fa torisation Assumption

Given n = pq (where p and q are prime), P = tn + 1
(t 2 Z and P is also prime) and (where ordP ( ) = p),
it is hard to nd a non-trivial fa tor of n.
This assumption is also used by Bri kell and M Curley [3℄ although there is no proof that knowledge of
of order p annot redu e the hardness of fa toring n.
Theorem 3.1. Under DL and Strong Fa torisation
assumptions, the above onstru tion (Se tion 3.1) is a
family of bundling homomorphisms.

Proof. To show that the above de nition is a bundling
homomorphism, we must show that

1. For any  2 ZP where  =
(mod P ), there
are q preimages in Zn .
2. For a given  2 ZP where  =
(mod P ), it is
diÆ ult to nd su h that =  (mod P ).
3. It is hard to nd two values ; ~ 2 Zn that map to
the same value.

To prove property 1, we note that knowing  =
(mod P ) for 2 Zn and ordP ( ) = p, there are exa tly
q values 0 0 , given by 0 = + ip; i = 0;    q 1, for
whi h
= +ip = . Hen e, there are q preimages

of  in Zn .
Now given  =
(mod P ), nding is equivalent
to solving an instan e of DL problem, whi h is hard
(property 2).
Property 3 means that it is diÆ ult to nd and ~
su h that
= ~ (mod P ). Suppose that there is
a probabilisti polynomial-time algorithm A~ that ould
ompute su h a ollision. Then, we onstru t an algo~ that on input (P; n; ), where njP 1, outputs
rithm D
the non-trivial fa tors of n as follows:
~ runs A~, and if A~ outputs a ollision, i.e. y
First, D
~
and y~, y 6= y~ su h that y  y~ (mod P ), then D
omputes:
y

y

= y~ mod P
y = y~ mod p
y~ = ^p ^ 2 Z
p = g d(y y~; n)

D~ is su essful with the same probability as A~ and al-

most equally eÆ ient. Hen e, it ontradi ts with the
strong fa torisation assumption.
Theorem

signer.

3.2. Our FSS s heme is se ure for the

A ording to the Theorem 4.1 in [14℄, we must nd
the size of the set T :

T := fd 2 Zn j d = 1 ^ (m

or

m)d = 0g

T := fd 2 Zn j d = 1 ^ m0 d = 0g
in ZP . There are exa tly q d's that satisfy the rst
equation d = 1 mod P . Sin e m 6= m, we have m0 2

f1; 2;    n 1g and so there is a unique message (namely,
m0 = q) that satis es m0 d = 0 (mod n). Hen e, jT j =

is ed with equality.

Together with theorem 4.2 [14℄, this implies that it
suÆ es to hoose  =  in the proposed s heme, as we
did in se tion 3.

To ompare two FSS's we x the level of se urity provided by the two s hemes and nd the size of the three
length parameters, and the number of operations (for
example multipli ation) required for signing and testing.
Table 1 gives the results of omparison of four FSS
s hemes when the se urity levels of the re eiver and the
sender are given by k and  , respe tively. In this omparison, the rst two s hemes ( rst and se ond olumn
of the table) are hosen be ause they have provable seurity. The rst s heme, referred to as vHP in this paper, is the most eÆ ient provably se ure s heme. The
third s heme, although does not have a omplete se urity proof (although it is not diÆ ult to onstru t su h
a proof), is in luded be ause it has an expli it proof
of forgery by revealing the se ret fa tors of a modulus. Column four orresponds to the s heme proposed
in this paper.
We use the same value of  and k for all the systems and determine the size of the three length parameters. The hard underlying problem in all four s hemes
are DL, Subgroup DL [12℄ and/or Fa torisation. This
means the same level of re eiver's se urity (given by the
value of parameter k ) translates into into di erent size
primes and moduli. In parti ular, the se urity level of a
151 bits subgroup dis rete logarithm with basi primes
of at least 1881 bits, is the same as fa torisation of a
1881 bits RSA modulus [12℄.
To nd the required size of primes in vHP s heme,
assuming se urity parameters (k;  ) are given, rst
K = max(k; ) is found and then the prime q is hosen
su h that jq j2  K . The bundling degree in this s heme
is q and the value of p is hosen su h that q jp 1 and
(p 1)=q be upper-bounded by a polynomial in K (page
237 and 238 [17℄). The size of jpj2 must be hosen a ording to standard dis rete logarithm problem, whi h
for adequate se urity must be at least 1881 bits [12℄.
However, the size of jq j2 an be hosen as low as 151
bits [12℄. Sin e jpj2 and jq j2 are to some extent inde^ to denote jpj2 .
pendent, we use K
In our proposed s heme bundling degree and hen e
se urity level of the sender is jq j2 . The se urity of the
re eiver is determined by the diÆ ulty of DL in ZP and
fa torisation of n. Assume jpj2  jq j2  jn2j2 . Then
we rst nd Nk whi h is the modulus size for whi h
fa torisation has diÆ ulty k . Now sin e P  n, DL
in ZP will have diÆ ulty k [12℄ and we hoose K =
max ( N2k ;  ), jq j2 = K  jpj2 and P  n. With these
hoi es the sender and re eiver level of se urity is at
least  and k , respe tively. For example for (k;  ) =
(151; 151), we rst nd N151 = 1881 [12℄ and hoose
K = max (1881=2; 151) = 941 whi h results in jpj2 
jqj2  941 and jnj2  jP j2  1882. Sin e jP j2 an be
^ to denote jP j2 ,
hosen mu h greater than jnj2 , we use K
^  2K .
and so when jP j2  jnj2 , we have K

1.

3.2. Multiple Re ipient S heme
Although we have restri ted ourselves to single re ipient, but it is not diÆ ult to extend the s heme to
multiple re ipients. In fa t, the only di eren e in that
ase is to in lude a trusted enter and provide zeroknowledge proofs that show that the hosen parameters of the prekey have the orre t forms. That is we
need to ensure that n, P and , have the desired forms.
Using [4℄, an element n an be proven to be an RSA
modulus n = pq , where both p and q are safe primes.
Then, P is tested for primality. This an be done by
using various primality testing algorithms su h as the
Miller-Rabin probabilisti primality test [21℄ whi h runs
in polynomial time. Finally it is veri ed that n divides
P 1. Although it is easy to show that the order of
is a multiple of p (without knowing p, for example
?
by verifying n =
1 (mod P )), but showing that the
order is stri tly p needs more e ort. We an a hieve
the zero knowledge proof of ordP ( ) = p by ombining
the idea mentioned in se tion 3.2 and 4.2 of [4℄. More
pre isely, the prover has to prove that he knows p that
satis es p = 1 mod P , and p is a prime number. On
the other hand, after verifying this proof, the re eiver
(or the sender in the ontext of this paper) only needs
?
to he k whether n =
1 mod P , and hen e, proving
that p = 1 mod P .

4. OPTIMALITY AND EFFICIENCY
The aim of this se tion is to ompare eÆ ien y of our
proposed s heme with those of the best known FSS
s hemes. EÆ ien y of a fail-stop signature system has
been measured in terms of three length parameters: the
lengths of the se ret key, the publi key and the signature, and the amount of omputation required in ea h
ase. Later in this se tion, we introdu e a new measure, eÆ ien y with respe t to message length whi h
orresponds to eÆ ient use of ommuni ation hannel.
Pedersen and P tzmann [14℄ proved that if the se urity
level of the sender is  and N messages are to be signed,
then the size of length parameters are lower bounded by
(N +1)( 1),  and 2 1, respe tively. These bounds
do not depend on the se urity level of the re eiver whi h
is measured by the parameter k and determines the size
of the of the underlying hard problem(s).
Definition 4.1. [14℄ A FSS s heme with se urity parameters k and  is alled optimal with respe t to se ret
key length, publi key length or the signature length, if
the lower bound on the orresponding parameter is sat-

A Comparison

In the fa torisation s heme of [14℄, the se urity level
of the sender,  satis es  =  +  where  is the
bundling degree and 2 is the size of the message spa e.
The se urity parameter of the re eiver, k , is determined
by the diÆ ulty of fa toring the modulus n. Now for
a given pair of se urity parameters, (k;  ), the size of
modulus Nk is determined by k but determining  requires knowledge of the size of the message spa e. Assume  = jpj2  jq j2 = Nk =2. This means that
 =  + Nk =2. Now the eÆ ien y parameters of the
system an be given as shown in the table. In parti ular the size of se ret and publi keys are 2( + Nk ) and
2Nk respe tively.
In RSA-based FSS s heme [22℄,  = j(n)j2 , and seurity of the re eiver is determined by the diÆ ulty of
fa toring n. This means that   jnj2 . To design a system with se urity parameters (k;  ), rst Nk , the modulus size that provides se urity level k for the re eiver is
determined and then K = max(; jNk j2 ). The modulus
n is hosen su h that jnj2 = K . With this hoi e, the
system provides adequate se urity for the sender and
the re eiver.

PK
(mult)
Sign
(mult)
Test
(mult)
Length of
SK(bits)
Length of
PK(bits)
Length of
a signature
(bits)
Prekey
Length
Length of
a message
(bits)
Min size of
K (bits)[12℄
Min size of
^ (bits)[12℄
K
Underlying
hard
Problem

DL[24℄ Fa t[14℄ RSA[22℄ Our FSS
4K
2

2K
K

4K
2

4K
1

3K

2K + 

3K

4K

4K

4K + 2

4K

4K

2K^
2K

2K
2K + 

2K
4K

^
2K
2K

bounds given in [14℄, and in fa t both s hemes are nearly
(nearly a hieving the bounds) optimal with respe t to
the signature length.

DL[24℄ Our FSS Lower Bound
Length of SK

4K = 4

4K = 4

Length of PK

^
2K

2K^

Signature Length

2K = 2

2K = 2

3K

3K
K

2(K + K^ )
2K

151

941

1881

941

1881

n/a

n/a

1881

DL

Fa t

RSA

DL
& Fa t

K

Table 1. Comparison of omputation (number of
multipli ations) and eÆ ien y parameters

The table shows that be ause of the subgroup DL
problem, K in vHP s heme an be as low as 151 bits,
^ in
while in our s heme it must be at least 941 bits. K
vHP and our s heme must be at least 1881 bits [12℄.
Table 2 shows that performan e of vHP and our
s heme are nearly the same with respe t to the lower

1)


2

1

Table 2. Comparison between vHP, our s heme and
optimal lower bound for N = 1

EÆ ien y with respe t to the message-length

In pra ti e, we also need to onsider relative lengths of
the message and the signature. If the length of the signature and the message are denoted by jy j2 and jxj2
respe tively, ^ = jy j2 =jxj2 is a measure of ommuni ation eÆ ien y of the s heme. For example ^ = 1 means
that to authenti ate one bit information, one bit extra
(signature) must be sent over the hannel.
Now in our s heme messages and signatures are both
from Zn and so ^ = 1. In vHP s heme messages and
signatures belong to subgroups of size q and 2jq j2 respe tively. This means that ^ = 2 and so to authenti ate one bit message 2 bits signature must be used.
In the fa torisation s heme of [14℄, messages are  bits,
and signatures are k +  +  bits. Assuming that k = ,
then ^ > 2. In the RSA based FSS in [22℄, messages belong to Zn and signature are of size 4jnj2 . This means
that ^ = 4.
Table 3 summarises these results.
^

^
K + 3K
K

2(

DL[24℄ Fa t[14℄ RSA[22℄ Our FSS
2

>2

4

1

Table 3. Comparison of ommuni ation eÆ ien y with
respe t to the message-length

Signing Long Messages

Tables 1 and 3 show that the size of the input to the signature algorithm in vHP and our s heme are K and 2K ,
that is at least 151 and 1882 bits ([12℄), respe tively. For
messages longer than these sizes hash-then-en rypt [14℄
method an be used. This has two impa ts.




To prove forgery, rather than showing that the underlying assumption of the s heme is broken it will
be shown that a ollision for the ollision-resistant
hash fun tion used for hashing is found.
The hash fun tion must be based on a omputational assumption. Hash fun tions with this property, developed in [5, 6℄, require on average one
modular multipli ation for one bit of the message
and so drasti ally redu e the speed of signature
generation and testing.

The above points imply that signing a message of
length ` bits, 151 < ` < 1882, using vHP requires on
average ` more modular multipli ations ompared to
our s heme.

4.1. Multiple Messages
We an extend our s heme to sign more than one message without hanging the key using the method in [24℄.
Suppose t 1 messages are to be signed.
The signer hooses a se ret key k0 ; k1 ;    ; kt 1 2 Zn ,
and publishes the orresponding publi key

; 2 ;    ; t 1 ) = ( k0 ; k1 ; k2 ;    ; kt 1 )
where i 2 ZP ; i = 0; 1    t 1.
To sign a message x 2 Zn , S omputes
y = k0 + k1 x + k2 x2 +    + kt 1 xt 1 mod n
The signature y passes the veri ation test if
( 0;

1

?
y=

0

x x2    xt 1
1 2
t 1

mod P

Using theorem 4.4 of [13℄, it an be proved that the
signer has un onditional se urity after issuing signatures on t 1 di erent messages.

5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new fail-stop signature
s heme that uses two omputational assumptions. It
uses dis rete logarithm and fa torisation as the underlying assumptions for re ipient's se urity, and fa torisation as the underlying assumption for the proof of
forgery. If either of the two assumptions is broken, a
signature an be easily forged and so the se urity of the
system will be lost.
The proof of forgery is by revealing the non-trivial
fa tors of the modulus and so results in a fast veriation pro ess. We showed that the s heme an be
extended for signing multiple messages.
We ompared our s heme with the best known FSS
s heme, namely the vHP s heme, and two other s hemes
whi h are based on the diÆ ulty of fa torisation. The
omparison learly shows that our s heme is more efient than the other fa torisation based s hemes, and
its performan e is very similar to the vHP s heme.
We introdu ed a new measure of eÆ ien y for FSS
that is related to eÆ ient use of ommuni ation hannel and showed that with respe t to this measure, our
s heme has better performan e than vHP s heme and
the FSS s hemes based on fa torisation. We showed
that ompared to vHP s heme, our s heme is more efient for signing messages of up to 1881 bits.
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